En Suiza, en el mes de octubre del 2005, se inició el segundo seguimiento de influenza aviar en aves silvestres acuáticas y aves comerciales con manejo en pastoreo. Se examinaron hisopos cloacales por la prueba de transcriptasa reversa, reacción en cadena por la polimerasa en tiempo real (por sus siglas en Inglés rtRT-PCR), para la detección tanto del gen M; como del subtipo H5 del virus de influenza aviar. El seguimiento con más de 2000 muestras examinadas documentó la introducción del virus H5N1 en aves acuáticas salvajes en Suiza a mediados del mes de febrero del 2006. Al finalizar el mes de marzo, 29 canales de aves silvestres acuáticas fueron encontradas positivas a H5. En este mismo período, fueron puestos bajo vigilancia epidemiológica lotes de aves comerciales con manejo en pastoreo, encontrando resultados negativos para la presencia de virus de influenza aviar.
Wild waterfowl are the natural reservoir of avian influenza (AI) viruses (AIVs) (1, 8) . All 16 hemagglutinin (H) and nine neuraminidase (N) subtypes have been isolated from wild aquatic birds and shorebirds; the majority of them carry these viruses with no apparent clinical signs (9, 16) . Previous European AI surveys on migratory birds from flyways across Europe showed differing virus prevalence depending on location, year, and bird species (6, 7) .
The highly pathogenic H5N1 subtype of genotype ''Z'' emerged in Southeast Asia at the end of 2002, causing significant damage to the poultry industry and claiming a considerable number of human lives. Until 2005, the outbreaks were restricted to a number of Asian countries, including Indonesia, Vietnam, Thailand, and China (13, 17) . Although initial outbreaks were mainly reported in commercial poultry, this subtype also led to unusually high mortality in wild waterfowl (14) . During mid-2005, an unprecedented outbreak of highly pathogenic H5N1 AI among migratory birds was reported in Lake Qinghai, China. More than 1000 water birds were affected (11) . A few weeks later, the first H5N1 outbreaks were reported from Russia and Kazakhstan in both poultry and wild birds. It was the beginning of a rapid geographical spread of this lethal virus strain. To date, outbreaks in poultry and avian wildlife have occurred in more than 40 countries across Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Europe.
In In addition, domestic poultry (mainly ducks, geese, and ratites) with a special permit to be kept outdoors during a ban of free-range commercial poultry (initiated February 20, 2006) were tested twice over a period of 6 wk.
Sample collection. Ornithologists, hunters, or veterinarians collected cloacal swabs of both wild and domestic birds; the swabs were placed in Viral CulturetteÔ tubes (Becton Dickinson Microbiology Systems, Sparks, MD) and sent to the laboratory within 24 hr of collection. The majority of samples were instantly processed; the rest were stored at À80 C until processing. AVIAN DISEASES 51:355-358, 2007 Reference strains. The following AIV strains were used in all PCR runs: Confirmational tests. H5 positive specimens (cloacal swab and extraction product) were sent to the Veterinary Laboratories Agency for confirmation and N subtyping. Table 1 summarizes order, species, number, and results of the wild bird monitoring. Fig. 1 shows geographical distribution of H5-positive cases. The first H5-positive bird was a goosander (Mergus merganser) found dead on the Geneva Lake on February 26. Until March 25, another 28 dead birds (22 from the family Anatidae, four from the family Rallidae, and two from the family Podicipedidae) also tested positive. All of them originated from the Lake of Constance and along the first 20 km of the Hochrhein River (outfall of the Lake of Constance). In the H5 PCR amplification plot, the cycle threshold values of positive specimens varied from 26 to 40. All of the 110 domestic poultry flocks with special free-range permission were free from AIV. A further explanation for the low AI prevalence concerns both the choice of cloacal swabs as testing material and the RNA extraction method used. The latter (RNeasy Mini kit) is not the most appropriate method for RNA recovery from wild bird cloacal samples, which can contain endogenous PCR inhibitors. Furthermore, different researchers assert that tracheal swabs are better suited than cloacal swabs for H5N1 detection (13). For both these reasons, tracheal sampling and/or the TRIzol extraction (Invitrogen AG, Basel, Switzerland) are to be favored to achieve a lower virus detection limit in future monitoring actions.
RESULTS
In this study, AI positive birds were detected shortly after the first H5N1 reports in western Europe. They were all H5 positive and found close to the Swiss border, in proximity to the places where France and Germany signalized H5 cases as well (Department Ain, France; Baden Württemberg, Germany). The positive bird originating from Geneva Lake was a female goosander and remained a single isolated case. It is known that the females of this species spend the whole year on Geneva Lake (M. Kestenholz, pers. Comm.). This is a strong indication that H5N1 was introduced by migratory birds, presumably from France. The cycle threshold value of the PCR was 27, providing evidence of a high viral load in the feces. The reason why no other cases occurred in that region since February 26 remains obscure. The remaining 28 H5N1-positive birds were found on the Lake of Constance, which is a large lake on the Rhine between Germany, Switzerland, and Austria, and along 20 km of the outcoming watercourse (Hochrhein). The first positive bird there was a whooper swan (Cygnus cygnus, Anseriformes). Contrary to mute swans (Cygnus olor), whooper swans are rarely seen in Switzerland. This could have been the index case in that region.
The Lake of Constance is the most important water bird wintering place of the European inland, with wide shallow water areas, where especially tufted ducks (Aythya fuligula), pochards (Aythya ferina), and coots (Fulica atra) can find their main food source, i.e., zebra mussels (Dreissena polymorpha) on the bottom of the lake. In winter, by far the biggest water bird population of Switzerland (180,000 birds, 39%) (4) is found on these waters.
On both lakes mentioned above, control zones of 3-km range were established, and special teams patrolled the lakeshores and the riverbanks daily to collect dead water birds. Also, dead birds of prey and scavenging birds such as gulls and crows, known as having an action radius of up to 2 km and not bound to water, were collected to estimate the risk of H5N1 spread to commercial poultry. Virus spread to other areas and bird populations was not observed. The actual situation is rather favorable, because 90% of the winter water bird population (500,000 specimens, mid-January) (4) will have returned to their Northern breeding areas by mid-April. Virus spreading in the thinned out spring population is less probable as gathering of birds decreases.
Despite the promising situation, there are still concerns that H5N1 could spread to domestic poultry. Even if H5N1 cases remain in a controlled area or disappear with the migratory hosts, in spring other populations of migratory birds-mainly songbirds such as swallows (Hirundo rustica)-come back from their African wintering sites (among which are Nigerian regions), representing a danger of H5N1 reintroduction. These migratory long flyers will be monitored starting in April 2006. Possible persistence of H5N1 in resident waterfowl (e.g., mallards [Anas platyrhynchos] with 10,000-20,000 breeding pairs) (5) must be verified as well.
Switzerland is preventively keeping all commercial poultry and fancy breeds indoors. A first free-range ban period (substantially politically based and enforced without exceptions) was ordered starting October 15, 2005, for 7 wk.
The second, open-ended ban started on February 20. Special permits to enable free-range management, primarily due to the mating behavior of some bird species, e.g. geese, ducks, and ratites, were generously allowed. These flocks are tested twice within a 6-wk period. Further voluntary controls, mainly in fancy breeds, and serologic testing of commercial free-range poultry are planned.
The role of mammals in the spread of H5N1 still needs to be established. Experimental data on infection and epidemiology of H5N1 in mammals is sparse (10). In this study, the majority of the H5N1-positive birds showed signs of significant scavenging (e.g., absence of internal organs), presumably by foxes or other wild predators. Even an unexpected high number of domestic cats brought home dead waterfowl; two of these birds were H5N1 infected. Although several studies confirmed that domestic cats can be infected with H5N1 by eating infected bird meat (10), clinical examination and RT-PCR testing of the felines in this study showed a negative result (data not shown).
In conclusion, the fundamental role of systematic and global monitoring for future sustainable prevention and control of highly pathogenic AI must be emphasized.
